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Sanctions imposed by the United States and the 
European Union against Russia in response to 
its activities in Ukraine have been effective in 
undermining the Russian economy and potentially 
dissuading further Russian adventurism in Ukraine, 
but have not compelled a policy change in Moscow 
sufficient to correct the crisis. Though it is 
preferable to resolve the situation through the full 
implementation of  the Minsk cease-fire of  February 
2015, it could be argued that the reason this has not 
occurred is that the sanctions currently in place have 
not applied sufficient pressure on Moscow, and that 
the United States and the European Union should 
seek to impose additional measures. One of  the most 
critical elements of  the current sanctions attempt is to 
restrict future growth in the critical Russian oil sector 
without causing a disruptive, immediate curtailment 
of  supplies to the global market. Future sanctions 
could attempt to curtail oil exports immediately in 
an effort to inflict greater economic damage on the 
Russian economy and force a policy change from 
Moscow. 
This paper reviews the state of  the Russian economy 
and the role oil exports play in it. It offers an 
assessment of  various scenarios, based on Russian 
economic data, for the application of  sanctions 
pressure on Russian oil exports. 
I conclude that:
• It is possible to impose additional costs on 
Russia through the targeting of  Russian oil 
exports, but this will not be a silver bullet 
against the Russian economy. Though Russia 
is dependent on its oil exports, so too is the 
stability of  the international oil market, and 
this creates a ceiling for how much pressure 
can be applied against Russia’s oil exports. 
• However, reducing Russian oil exports by 
10 to 20 percent would impose real costs on 
Russia. It would further diminish expected 
GDP growth, already hard hit by the 
downturn in global oil prices, and exacerbate 
Russia’s current recession. Combined with 
other steps to reduce investment in Russia, 
hinder activities at its oil production sites, 
and isolate its major financial institutions 
and energy companies, restricting Russian oil 
exports could play a valuable role in escalating 
the pressure on the Russian government.
• Russia retains many response options that it 
could employ, not the least of  which is the 
ability to switch off  the taps to its natural 
gas exports to Europe. Russia would pay a 
cost for this but may be prepared to endure 
it. As such, the decision about whether to 
impose such sweeping sanctions will remain 
a politically difficult one for Europe. There 
also remains the question of  whether Russia 
could—and would be permitted to—divert 
its oil supply to alternative destinations, 
including to East Asia.
• Even if  executed, additional sanctions 
pressure on Russia probably would not be 
independently sufficient to compel Russian 
capitulation in Ukraine, including the 
surrender of  Crimea. As with many other 
instances of  sanctions being employed, they 
should be considered an element of  the 
Western strategy to confront Russia over its 
regional adventurism, not a strategy in and 
of  themselves. Moreover, the utility of  this 
tool needs to be balanced against the risk that 
an already-militant Russia will view military 
steps as the solution to its problems rather 
than the source of  them.
• At a minimum, it is worth beginning the 
exercise of  planning for future reductions 
of  Russian oil now: first, to underscore with 
Russia the degree of  international resolve 
in confronting it over Ukraine; and, second, 
to lay the groundwork for any future such 
decision and to counter anticipated hostile 
Russian reactions.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
Eighteen months ago, the West began to respond to 
indications of  Russian interference in the sovereignty 
of  Ukraine through political and economic pressure. 
Starting small, this pressure grew in mid to late 2014 
into a major sanctions campaign by the United States 
and the European Union against core Russian economic 
interests, particularly the future of  its energy sector and 
its overall access to the international financial system. 
Russia now faces a recession and prolonged loss of  
economic opportunity, but not an immediate economic 
crisis. In Ukraine, the situation remains tense, with 
reports emerging daily of  apparent Russian support for 
eastern Ukrainian insurgent groups. The Minsk cease-
fire, negotiated in early 2015, also remains fragile, with 
accusations of  cease-fire breaches traded daily between 
Kyiv and Moscow.
Though the European Union recently decided to extend 
its existing sanctions against Russia, absent a radical 
improvement in the situation in Ukraine, these measures 
do not appear capable of  creating an immediate 
economic crisis for Russia. This, however, is not the 
objective of  the current sanctions campaign. Certainly 
it is the case that provoking major economic turmoil in 
Russia was a goal, but in a way that did not provoke 
Russia to reject diplomacy altogether or damage global 
economic interests. Consequently, the sanctions selected 
were intended to change Russian behavior in the near 
term and prompt efforts to arrive at a satisfactory 
diplomatic solution. They were also intended to dissuade 
further Russian adventurism.
The real question is whether sanctions imposed thus far 
have exacted sufficient cost to prompt this change in 
behavior. Sanctions impairing Russia’s ability to tap into 
global capital markets have formed a sanctions “debt 
weapon” that will continue to inflict damage. Until these 
sanctions are removed, Russia and its sanctioned entities 
will continue to find it hard to roll over their existing 
debts and will have to tap into its foreign-exchange 
reserves to retire these foreign-currency obligations. 
But Russia has options to mitigate the effects of  the 
sanctions that are in place. For example, the steep cut 
in Russian imports at the end of  2014 and into 2015 (in 
part as a result of  Russia’s decision to ban the import of  
food from the West) may have limited the impact of  the 
debt weapon on the current account, the overall balance 
of  payments, and foreign-exchange reserves thus far. 
Similarly, since Russia’s debt is a long-term problem, 
the Russians have more time to figure out a response 
that will reduce the practical impact on their economy. 
Taken in combination with the aforementioned residual 
problems in Ukraine and uncertain future, it is possible 
that the sanctions in place at this time have exhausted 
their political usefulness.
These circumstances have prompted some discussion of  
what new kinds of  sanctions may be necessary in order 
press Russian President Vladimir Putin to invest himself  
fully in a political solution to the Ukrainian problem 
he helped to create. Further pressure on Russia’s 
energy sector has been raised as one possible option, 
especially oil exports, which remain a key driver for 
Russia’s economy. This option appears more attractive 
now because of  low oil prices and perceived oversupply 
of  the market, as well as Iranian oil coming back into 
the market as a result of  the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of  Action (JCPOA) concluded between Iran and 
the members of  the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
However, using Russia’s dependence on its oil exports 
for sanctions purposes is fraught with risk, both to the 
stability of  international oil markets and to Europe’s 
ability to continue importing the natural gas upon which 
many EU countries are dependent. 
This paper discusses whether pressure on Russia’s 
oil exports is achievable and would contribute to a 
diplomatic outcome. It begins with a review of  the 
sanctions presently in place against Russia as well as the 
state of  the Russian economy. It then explores an oil 
reduction strategy, akin to what was employed against 
Iran in 2011–2013, and examines its potential impact. 
This paper concludes that an oil reduction strategy 
could be implemented against Russia and cause further 
problems for the Russian government, but that its 
impact would be less than the damage already wrought 
by the drop in oil prices. Moreover, given Russia’s ability 
to reduce imports (both as a matter of  policy and as a 
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natural market response), the amount of  oil exports that 
would need to be cut off  to worsen Russia’s external 
accounts in an aggressive way likely would be far more 
than is achievable or wise. Considering that a reduction 
strategy would risk unintended consequences—including 
an increase in oil prices and threats against Europe’s 
import of  natural gas—this paper argues against making 
this sanction the linchpin of  an expanded sanctions 
campaign against Russia. But this is not to say that oil 
reduction efforts could not be part of  a broader package 
of  sanctions employed against the Russians. Rather, this 
paper argues that manageable reductions in Russian oil 
exports could be buttressed with an array of  sanctions 
targeting Russia’s economy and oil sector in particular. 
Importantly, in offering its assessment, this paper does 
not speak exhaustively as to whether such a campaign 
would achieve the West’s desired result of  resolving 
the sovereignty of  Ukraine and questions surrounding 
Crimea. Such questions are best left to experts on Russian 
politics and strategy. This paper’s sole ambition is to 
outline whether an approach that restricts oil exports 
could contribute to an already-established pressure 
strategy. That said, in the author’s view, Russia has made 
clear that its resistance to sanctions pressure will be 
significant. Consequently, the efficacy of  sanctions in 
this context, particularly given the size of  the Russian 
economy and its present importance to global energy 
markets, may be muted in comparison to other historical 
and current examples, and certainly in the near term. 
Those focused on the application of  sanctions on Russia 
should, like in the case of  Iran, prepare themselves for a 
multiyear campaign.
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REVIEW OF EXISTING RUSSIA SANCTIONS
Sanctions imposed against Russia thus far by the United 
States, the European Union, and their partners basically 
fall into two categories::
1. Designation of  individuals and entities for 
their direct role in Russia’s intervention in 
Ukraine and irredentism in Crimea; and
2. Sectoral sanctions intended to dissuade further 
Russian activities in Ukraine. 
The first category of  sanctions is essentially intended 
to punish offenders (veiled as trying to change their 
behavior) and deter others from involving themselves 
in such activities. The sanctions’ direct economic 
implications depend greatly on whether the individuals 
and entities in question have substantial assets in the 
jurisdiction imposing the sanctions. Based upon a 
cursory review of  the Office of  Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons List (colloquially termed the SDN list), it is 
unlikely that the US designations imposed thus far 
would have had much of  a direct financial impact.1 Most 
SDNs are individuals, and most of  the individuals and 
entities on the list have not, thus far, been reported to 
have substantial US financial holdings, though one press 
report indicated that as much as $640 million has been 
frozen in the United States as a result.2 Some individuals 
identified had major ownership stakes of  significant 
companies, but there are reports that these individuals 
have taken steps to reduce their legal ownership of  these 
companies in order to make the application of  sanctions 
pressure against the companies more difficult.3 Legally, 
these companies can still be targeted under the principle 
of  sanctions proving ownership or control, but this is a 
more complicated standard to enforce.
The probably modest impact of  specific designations is 
not surprising. Though big successes have been achieved 
through asset freezes—such as with Muammar Qaddhafi’s 
Libya in 2011—most of  the impact of  such designations 
is through the chilling effect these actions have on the 
overall business climate of  a country or targeted sector. 
Treasury Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser pointed to 
this reality in his testimony of  July 2014 in his recitation 
of  the many ways in which sanctions—which were far 
more limited at the time than at present—had damaged 
Russia; none of  these examples were a direct result of  
an asset freeze.4 Then Director of  Treasury’s OFAC 
Adam Szubin (who has since been nominated to the post 
of  Under Secretary of  the Treasury for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence) made a similar point in a Treasury 
blog post on June 2, 2014: “Targeted financial sanctions 
apply concentrated pressure on bad actors, isolating 
them and making it harder for them to continue their 
bad activities.”5 
Of  far greater economic impact were the sectoral 
sanctions imposed by the United States starting in July 
2014. In total (and in general terms), these sanctions:
1. Prohibit US persons* from providing new 
debt or new equity greater than thirty days’ 
maturity to identified persons operating in the 
Russian financial sector.
2. Prohibit US persons from providing new debt 
greater than ninety days’ maturity to identified 
persons operating in the Russian energy sector. 
3. Prohibit the export of  US goods, services 
(except for financial services), or technology 
in support of  exploration or production for 
deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects 
that have the potential to produce oil in the 
Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed 
by the Russian Federation and extending from 
its territory, to identified persons operating in 
the Russian energy sector.
4. Prohibit US persons from providing new debt 
greater than thirty days’ maturity to identified 
__________________
* “Persons” here are defined as legal persons, which could be individual human beings, companies, banks, etc. Persons can be 
defined differently depending on the sanctions regime. See Executive Order 13662 for the definition in the Russian context: 
“individual or entity.” Available at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine_eo3.pdf. 
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persons operating in the Russian defense 
sector. 
5. Impose full blocking sanctions on designated 
persons operating in the Russian defense 
sector (fourteen designations).
These sanctions build on a policy of  denial for export 
license applications for key modernization technology 
and for certain other items for military end use 
(implemented by the Department of  Commerce) and the 
termination of  export credit and development financing 
for projects in Russia.
The European Union imposed similar sectoral measures 
in concert with the United States.
In all, these measures offer a startling twist on traditional 
sectoral sanctions, which have typically identified areas 
of  activity and then denied cooperation and services 
with them. In Russia’s case, it is possible for US and EU 
companies to do business with entities and individuals 
identified as being involved in these sectors, so long 
as the activities do not cross into expressly prohibited 
areas. This creates compliance burdens on the 
companies themselves and, ultimately, could cause them 
to reconsider their investments in Russia, though the 
number of  companies that have extricated themselves 
from Russia altogether is quite small.
The targeting of  company-specific debt is also a 
unique innovation that merits discussion. Most major 
companies utilize debt instruments. By making this 
normal activity sanctionable, the United States and the 
European Union have squeezed the long-term health of  
Russia’s major industrial sectors, while not imperiling 
their active business. This has permitted oil and natural 
gas, for example, to continue to flow even to sanctioning 
jurisdictions while still hampering the longevity of  
the institutions conducting the transactions. And the 
companies involved on the Russian side have been faced 
with a unique conundrum: continue with these activities 
(e.g., selling natural gas) in order to keep their current 
business going, or cut off  such transactions in order to 
impose a cost on the sanctioning parties. Thus far, the 
Russians have decided to keep business moving. This was 
not a uniform decision, of  course, and Russia’s decision 
to reduce its imports of  foreign goods—dismissed as a 
fit of  pique—may have played a major role in moderating 
some of  the impacts of  sanctions on Russia, as the 
following economic analysis will make clear.
ISSUE BRIEF: REVISITING OIL SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
8 |  CENTER ON GLObAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMbIA SIPA
REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RUSSIA SANCTIONS
In part because Russia is a large, somewhat diversified 
economy, quantifying precisely the damage caused 
by sanctions is difficult. This report concludes that 
the impact of  sanctions on Russia has been serious, 
compounding already present structural problems in the 
Russian economy, but that Russian policy responses have 
helped it to weather the storm thus far. 
It has been widely reported that Russian GDP growth fell 
in 2013 and 2014, and that it is predicted to continue to 
contract in 2015 and 2016. The World Bank’s April 2015 
report on the Russian economy6 forecast a contraction 
of  3.8 percent in 2015, followed by a 0.3 percent 
decline in 2016; the IMF has forecast a somewhat worse 
contraction of  1.1 percent in 2016.7 However, Russian 
GDP was on a downward trajectory well before sanctions 
were imposed, as shown in Figure 1.
According to the World Bank’s report, sanctions made 
things worse in Russia, primarily by:
1. Increasing volatility on the foreign-exchange 
market and contributing to a significant 
depreciation of  the ruble;
2. Impairing Russia’s access to international 
financial markets; and 
3. Creating a negative climate around Russia, 
depressing both domestic consumption and 
foreign investment in the country. 
Compounding these impacts was the drop in oil 
prices starting in the summer of  2014 and continuing 
throughout the beginning of  2015. Russia’s economy is 
largely dependent on its ability to export energy. Russian 
oil production continues to be among the highest in 
the world, estimated at 10.93 million barrels per day at 
the end of  2014.8 Combined with nearly $70 billion in 
natural gas exports annually, over 2011–2013, energy 
exports contribute nearly $350 billion of  income every 
year to the Russian economy.9 Russia’s net oil exports 
of  approximately 7.2 million10 barrels per day (bpd) 
lost half  their value when prices plunged below $50 a 
barrel, costing Russia approximately $160 billion in lost 
earnings, according to President Vladimir Putin.11 
Figure 1: Russian GDP Growth  
(Percent GDP growth)
Source: World Bank, May 2015.
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The IMF has noted that oil dependence in Russia has 
become a systemic weakness. The Russians have been 
able to sustain a large current account surplus over the 
last decade because they have been generally able to sell 
their energy products at high prices, but at the expense 
of  having become a petro-state in which it derives two-
thirds of  its exports from energy. This is particularly 
the case for the government itself, as oil revenues have 
“masked” a considerable non-oil deficit.12 
When oil prices dropped and sanctions began to bite, 
a combination of  market forces (such as the declining 
ruble), and Russia’s policy response to trim sails by 
reducing imports, may have moderated considerably 
the impact of  the sanctions on Russia’s balance of  
payments. By reducing imports, the lost export revenue 
was mooted in terms of  Russia’s trade balance, and 
Russia maintained a current account surplus throughout 
2014. Table 1 articulates these long-standing import 
compression dynamics in the Russian economy, which 
Figure 2 demonstrates further.
Though the current account continues to hold stable 
and at a surplus, the Russian economy has suffered. 
For example, inflation has risen dramatically in Russia, 
to a thirteen-year high of  16.9 percent in March 2015.13 
Naturally, this has had a major impact on the price of  
food and other basic commodities. Unemployment 
has also risen in Russia but is still comparatively low: 
5.8 percent, according to the Russian statistical agency 
Rosstat.14 This is, in part, because Russia has historically 















Figure 2: Select Russian Balance of  Payment Indicators 
(Billions of  US dollars)
Table 1: Russia’s Current Account Balance from 2007–2014 
Source: World Bank, April 2015.
Source: World Bank, April 2015.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Current Account 72.2 103.9 50.4 67.5 97.3 71.3 34.1 56.7
     Exports 346.5 466.3 297.2 392.7 515.4 528 523.3 496.7
     Imports 223.1 288.7 183.9 245.7 318.6 335.7 343 308
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has been a real wage crunch for the Russian people and 
partly explains why expensive imports—made more so 
by the collapse of  the ruble—dropped at the end of  
2014. 
At this same time, the World Bank notes that capital 
“fled” Russia in the fourth quarter of  2014, both as the 
Russian government fought the depreciation of  the ruble 
and as households and corporates converted deposits 
to hard currency.16 Russia’s credit rating plummeted. 
As the World Bank noted, “early in January 2015, Fitch 
downgraded Russia’s sovereign debt rating to one notch 
above noninvestment; later in January and February, 
S&P and Moody’s both downgraded Russia’s sovereign 
rating to below investment grade.”17 
Taken in combination with the imposition of  sanctions—
which cut off  Russia from normal international finance 
and the ability to roll over existing debts—Russia’s hard 
currency reserves began to suffer. According to the 
Central Bank of  Russia, its foreign-exchange reserves 
went from approximately $478 billion at the end of  June 
2014 to $356 billion at the end of  April 2015,18 most of  
which was used in the fourth quarter of  2014 and was 
used to retire existing debts.19  
The strain on its reserves did not end there. Russia 
continues to have a considerable amount of  external 
debt outstanding, nearly $560 billion at the end of  March 
2015, of  which nearly $90 billion is falling due in the 
next four quarters.20 Russia now faces a substantial fiscal 
deficit, estimated to be as high as 3.8 percent of  GDP 
this year, caused by the drop in oil prices. The Russian 
government decided to use nearly $50 billion from its 
depleted national reserves to cover the fiscal deficit 
rather than expose itself  to deeper external debt and 
the increased borrowing costs that result from its credit 
rating and widened spreads.21 Taken in combination 
with other commitments for Russian foreign-exchange 
reserves, it is possible that Russia’s truly liquid reserves 
could be as low as $140 billion.22 
Consequently, Russia potentially has a major vulnerability 
with respect to its ability to acquire and maintain hard 
currency reserves in the face of  sanctions. Without 
such reserves, Russia will find it difficult to finance its 
government operations or to pay off  its various debts 
(both government and corporate). Moreover, the 
targeting of  Russia’s reserves would force it to make 
some tough decisions about its economic priorities and 
where to utilize this dwindling asset. Such choices would 
complicate government operations and potentially 
impose costs on the Russian population that, thus far, 
the Russian government has sought to avoid.
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SEEKING OIL REDUCTIONS 
This economic analysis suggests that, if  a sanctioning 
state wished to inflict further damage on the Russian 
economy, the best place to start would be with Russia’s 
current account, by pressuring reserves through the 
reduction of  energy exports, primarily oil. 
Imposing sanctions on Russia’s oil sector would not be 
an easy venture, not the least because as a major supplier 
it would take substantial cuts in global supply in order to 
register substantial effects in the Russian economy. But 
exactly how much would have to be cut from Russian oil 
exports in order to have an effect?
To answer this question, this paper analyzes a variety 
of  oil reduction and price scenarios, using Russian 
economic data from 2013, which represents the last data 
set available that did not show distortions from either 
sanctions or the recent drop in oil prices.
It starts by looking at a baseline scenario using the data 
provided by the IMF in its 2014 Article IV report. The 
baseline set of  data looks as follows, showing the expected 
result of  a positive trade balance and current account 
surplus afforded by high oil prices and a comfortable 
margin between exports and imports (Table 2). 
But what if  crude oil export reductions had taken place? 
For comparison’s sake, let us look at the baseline scenario 
and three reduction scenarios (5 percent, 10 percent, and 
20 percent) in which oil price and all other variables are 
held constant.
Table 2: 2013 IMF Article IV Baseline  
(Figures are in billions of  USD unless otherwise noted.)
Source: World Bank, April 2015.
Article IV data
Current Account 32.8
     Trade Balance 180.3
          Exports 523.3
               Non-energy 173.1
               Energy 350.2
                    Oil 283
                    Gas 67.2
     Imports -343
     Services -58.6
     Income -78.9
     Current Transfers -9.2
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There is some variation due to rounding.1 To simplify 
the analysis and avoid going product by product, I took 
a price based on Russian oil product revenue and total 
tonnage. I acknowledge that this creates some risk of  
distortion due to the varying prices of  the myriad oil 
products.
Though dramatically oversimplified, this simple chart 
shows how a reasonable current account surplus can 
quickly become a current account deficit if  oil exports 
dropped. 
To apply the analysis further, now let us extrapolate 
the impact of  a reduction of  price combined with a 
reduction in oil revenues. Taking the exact same data and 
halving the price of  oil from $100 per barrel to $50 per 
barrel shows a completely different picture.
Table 3: Reduction Scenarios  
(Figures are in billions of  USD unless otherwise noted.)
Source: IMF Article IV, July 2014; crude oil and oil product data from Haver; author’s calculations.
Article IV data 5% crude oil  
export reduction
10% crude oil  
export reduction
20% crude oil  
export reduction
Current Account 32.8 23.9 15.3 -2.1
     Trade Balance 180.3 171.5 162.9 145.5
          Exports 523.3 514.4 505.9 488.5
               Non-energy 173.1 173.1 173.1 173.1
               Energy 350.2 341.4 332.8 315.4
                    Oil 283 274.2 265.6 248.2
                         Crude Oil 173.5 164.8 156.2 138.8
                              Volume                                                                
                              (billion barrels)
1.735 1.648 1.562 1.388
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/barrel)
100 100 100 100
                         Oil Products 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4
                              Volume  
                              (billion tonnes)
151.6 151.6 151.6 151.6
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/tonne)*
721.5 721.5 721.5 721.5
                         Gas 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.2
     Imports -343 -343 -343 -343
     Services -58.6 -58.6 -58.6 -58.6
     Income -78.9 -78.9 -78.9 -78.9
     Current Transfers -9.2 -9.2 -9.2 -9.2
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The results are stark. Though Russia in 2013 would have 
been harmed by a crude oil export reduction, the impact 
of  lowered prices would have been far more significant. 
This is a somewhat obvious point, as the point of  
comparison is a 50 percent cut in prices versus a 5 to 20 
percent cut in exports; the higher cut in prices naturally 
leads to less revenue than a cut in exports. 
But there is a less obvious point here: that the reduction 
in oil prices that has actually occurred to date has reduced 
the per-barrel impact of  an export reduction strategy, 
limiting the efficacy of  one now. Figure 3 demonstrates 
this graphically, contrasting the relative impact of  oil 
export reductions against price. The curve for higher-
priced oil is, not surprising, steeper than the curve for 
lower-priced oil, a fact that is drawn out dramatically 
on the right side of  the chart at 50 percent and 75 
percent reductions. (Of  course, it is worth noting that 
this analysis might not hold if  oil prices were to outright 
collapse: a $10-per-barrel oil price would certainly have a 
disproportionately negative effect on Russia.)
Table 4: Reduction Scenarios at 50% of  Price  
(Figures are in billions of  USD unless otherwise noted.)
Source: IMF Article IV, July 2014; crude oil and oil product data from Haver; author’s calculations.
Article IV data 5% crude oil  
export reduction
10% crude oil  
export reduction
20% crude oil  
export reduction
Current Account 32.8 -113.2 -117.5 -126.2
     Trade Balance 180.3 34.4 30.1 21.4
          Exports 523.3 377.4 373.1 364.4
               Non-energy 173.1 173.1 173.1 173.1
               Energy 350.2 204.3 200.0 191.3
                    Oil 283 137.1 132.8 124.1
                         Crude Oil 173.5 82.4 78.1 69.4
                              Volume                                                                
                              (billion barrels)
1.735 1.648 1.562 1.388
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/barrel)
100 50 50 50
                         Oil Products 109.4 54.7 54.7 54.7
                              Volume  
                              (billion tonnes)
151.6 151.6 151.6 151.6
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/tonne)*
721.5 360.7 360.7 360.7
                         Gas 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.2
     Imports -343.0 -343.0 -343.0 -343.0
     Services -58.6 -58.6 -58.6 -58.6
     Income -78.9 -78.9 -78.9 -78.9
     Current Transfers -9.2 -9.2 -9.2 -9.2
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But we also know that the Russian government and market 
response to reduced exports is import compression. In 
its April report, the World Bank offers a “lower-bound” 
oil price scenario, intended to demonstrate the potential 
effects on Russia from a continued low oil price 
environment. The scenario is based on an assumption 
of  oil averaging $45 per barrel for 2015 and $50 per 
barrel for 2016, or between 12 to 20 percent less than 
the present $60- to $70-per-barrel prices realized in May 
2015. This lower-bound scenario serves as an excellent 
proxy for how an oil export reduction strategy in which 
prices remain roughly constant would affect Russia’s 
economy.
The results are surprising. Although GDP would continue 
to contract—now at -4.6 percent in 2015 compared 
to the baseline estimates of  -3.8 percent—the current 
account surplus would likely increase to approximately 
$83.1 billion. The World Bank concludes that this would 
occur because import compression would intensify as 
imported goods became even more expensive, if  not 
prohibited altogether by a government keen to prevent 
hard currency from flowing out of  the country and to 
avoid the resulting impact on Russia’s overall economic 
activity.
Arguably, with the ability to reduce imports available to 
Russia, any oil reduction strategy targeting the current 
account would have to overcome this natural Russian 
defense mechanism (which, again, has both a policy 
dimension as well as a market response). Table 5 reduces 
imports down to their lowest value in recent memory: 
$183.9 billion in 2009, following the oil price crash and 

























Export Volume Reduction (Percent of 2013 Exports) 
Export earnings with oil at $100/barrel 
Export earnings with oil at $60/barrel 
Figure 3: Impact of  Oil Price on Export Volume Reduction Value  
(In billions of  US dollars)
Source: author’s calculations.
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Table 5: Reduction Scenarios at 50% of  Price with Import Compression  
(Figures are in billions of  USD unless otherwise noted.)
Source: IMF Article IV, July 2014; crude oil and oil product data from Haver; author’s calculations.
Article IV data 5% crude oil  
export reduction
10% crude oil  
export reduction
20% crude oil  
export reduction
Current Account 32.8 45.9 41.6 32.9
     Trade Balance 180.3 193.5 189.2 180.5
          Exports 523.3 377.4 373.1 364.4
               Non-energy 173.1 173.1 173.1 173.1
               Energy 350.2 204.3 200 191.3
                    Oil 283 137.1 132.8 124.1
                         Crude Oil 173.5 82.4 78.1 69.4
                              Volume                                                                
                              (billion barrels)
1.735 1.648 1.562 1.388
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/barrel)
100 50 50 50
                         Oil Products 109.4 54.7 54.7 54.7
                              Volume  
                              (billion tonnes)
151.6 151.6 151.6 151.6
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/tonne)*
721.5 360.7 360.7 360.7
                         Gas 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.2
     Imports -343 -183.9 -183.9 -183.9
     Services -58.6 -58.6 -58.6 -58.6
     Income -78.9 -78.9 -78.9 -78.9
     Current Transfers -9.2 -9.2 -9.2 -9.2
This table demonstrates that far more would have to 
be done in order to drive the Russian current account 
to deficit given the probable import compression. By 
extrapolating these figures out further, one can estimate 
that it would require at least reducing Russian crude oil 
exports by 725 million barrels annually, or 2.76 million 
bpd, to drive the current account to deficit.
However, before concluding that oil export reductions 
could be neutered by a Russian response, a critical 
omission has to be rectified: throughout the above 
analysis, oil products were not touched at all. What if  
a similar reduction strategy were employed against oil 
products in addition to crude oil? A deeper reduction in 
Russia’s current account can be achieved but still remains 
insufficient to drive it into deficit.
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That said, even without a current account deficit, 
reducing Russia’s oil revenues by approximately 15 to 20 
percent would have a negative impact on its economy. 
The complete World Bank chart referenced above is 
worth examination here.
Table 6: Reduction Scenarios at 50% of  Price with Import Compression  
(Figures are in billions of  USD unless otherwise noted.)
Source: IMF Article IV, July 2014; crude oil and oil product data from Haver; author’s calculations.
Article IV data 5% oil export  
reduction
10% oil export 
reduction
20% oil export 
reduction
Current Account 32.8 43.3 36.2 22.1
     Trade Balance 180.3 190.9 183.8 169.7
          Exports 523.3 374.8 367.7 353.6
               Non-energy 173.1 173.1 173.1 173.1
               Energy 350.2 201.7 194.6 180.5
                    Oil 283 134.5 127.4 113.3
                         Crude Oil 173.5 82.4 78.1 69.4
                              Volume                                                                
                              (billion barrels)
1.735 1.648 1.562 1.388
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/barrel)
100 50 50 50
                         Oil Products 109.4 52 49.3 43.8
                              Volume  
                              (billion tonnes)
151.6 144 136.4 121.3
                              Implicit Price  
                              ($/tonne)*
721.5 360.7 360.7 360.7
                         Gas 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.2
     Imports -343 -183.9 -183.9 -183.9
     Services -58.6 -58.6 -58.6 -58.6
     Income -78.9 -78.9 -78.9 -78.9
     Current Transfers -9.2 -9.2 -9.2 -9.2
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Table 7: World Bank Assessment of  Oil Revenue Impacts on Russia 
Source: World Bank.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Oil price (USD per barrel, WB average) 105.0 104.0 97.6 45.0 50.0
GDP growth, percent 3.4 1.3 0.6 -4.6 -1.0
Consumption growth, percent 6.4 3.9 1.5 -6.6 -2.7
Gross capital formation, percent 3.0 -6.6 -5.7 -17.1 -0.4
General government balance, percent of GDP 0.4 -1.3 -1.2 -4.5 -2.6
Current account (USD billions) 71.3 34.1 56.7 83.1 79.7
     Percent of GDP 3.6 1.6 3.0 7.1 5.8
Capital and financial account (USD billions) -32.3 -62.2 -143.2 -130.2 -79.7
     Percent of GDP -1.6 -3.0 -7.6 -11.1 -5.8
CPI inflation (average) 5.1 6.8 7.7 18.0 9.0
With consumption growth and gross capital formation 
off  as severely as this chart describes, the Russian 
economy would struggle considerably. Moreover, the 
negative general government balance would also force 
the Russian government to tap more heavily into its 
reserves, helping to counteract to some degree the 
import compression that the Russians would likely 
employ to weather their current account crisis. As such, 
though oil reductions would not serve as a deathblow 
to the Russian economy, they certainly would inflict 
damage that other sanctions measures could potentially 
complement. Additionally, one should not lose sight 
of  the fact that import compression and consumption 
reductions actually equate to real-world problems for 
ordinary Russians. As noted above, real wages and 
underemployment are a problem in Russia today. One 
could imagine that, even if  the Russian economy were 
still operating in the black, the people of  Russia would 
experience real pain, which could translate to political 
pressure on the Russian government.
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Of  course, it is not possible to simply remove Russian 
oil from the market without having some impact on oil 
prices. The question is how much of  an impact and for 
how long. 
The report takes the view that a price increase would 
be likely, but that global spare capacity and potential for 
new production are such that the price impact could be 
managed both in terms of  the broader economy and in 
preventing Russia from benefitting from increased rents.
First, though, let’s take the factors one at a time.
The standard Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) definition of  spare capacity is “the volume of  
production that can be brought on within thirty days 
and sustained for at least ninety days,”23 and estimating 
it used to be—and may still be—a straightforward 
endeavor. Calculations were made about total production 
capacity and global consumption, with the expectation 
being that—when prices got too high or a disruption 
took place—additional production could enter the 
market to help cool prices and restore some semblance 
of  balance. Spare capacity was a fluid thing, increasing 
as new production entered the market and diminishing 
as demand rose. Spare capacity shrank around 2003 and 
has remained at historically low levels since (except for 
a brief  period in 2008–2010), far below the roughly 3 to 
5 million barrels consistent with a well-managed market 
in the 1990s. 
It was in this world that the Iran oil reduction effort, 
on which similar Russian concepts would be modeled, 
took place. Between 2011 and 2013, sanctions removed 
nearly 1.5 million barrels per day of  Iranian crude oil 
from the market. As Figure 5 demonstrates, oil prices 
did go up in the period from January 2012 until March 
2012 right after the application of  sanctions, but the 
increase was relatively moderate and prices subsequently 
declined. The decline in part reflected, as is shown in 
Figure 6, an increase in Saudi exports, the growth in US 
shale production, and reduced European demand. But 
eventually prices did revert back to the $100-per-barrel 
level seen for much of  the period from the second half  
of  2012 until mid-2014. The price reaction was therefore 
substantial but limited in time.





























































































Figure 4: OPEC Total Spare Crude Oil Production Capacity, 1996–2016  
(In millions of  barrels per day)
Source: Energy Information Administration.
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US Crude Oil 
Production 
Figure 5: Monthly Average Oil Prices from 2011 to 2013 
(US dollars per barrel)
Figure 6: Crude Oil Production, Saudi Arabia and United States, 2010-2014 
(In millions of  barrels per day)
Source: Energy Information Administration.
Source: Energy Information Administration.
This is because spare capacity worked in managing the 
Iran reduction effort as intended: as a supply disruption, 
necessitating increased OPEC production. That said, the 
sanctions were themselves carefully orchestrated to avoid 
taking too much Iranian supply off  the market at once. 
Other key factors include: the effective communications 
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effort about US objectives, the fact that the effort was 
subject to presidential authority to curtail the sanctions 
against Iran should the market experience trouble, and 
the implementation undertaken with the expectation 
that reductions would be incremental. 
These factors should prompt consideration as to whether 
a similar loss of  Russian crude oil production would 
cause a major, prolonged increase in prices. OPEC spare 
capacity is currently estimated by the EIA to be 2.1 
million bpd,24 though it could be lower, particularly given 
increased Saudi oil demand. More importantly, however, 
the volume of  spare capacity needs to be viewed in the 
context of  today’s oil market and the reason for the 
low level.25 When the market is tight, low spare capacity 
represents underinvestment and limited ability to ramp 
up production to meet global disruptions. Today’s oil 
market, however, is oversupplied—with low prices, 
historically high inventory levels, robust US production 
even at lower prices, and relatively weak demand. In such 
a market, the low level of  spare capacity represents an 
explicit choice by Saudi Arabia not to actively manage 
the oil market, but rather to maximize sales and market 
share for myriad reasons beyond the scope of  this 
paper.26,27 What this means is that the current price may 
be viewed as artificially low due to Saudi Arabia’s refusal 
to maintain much spare capacity, and the higher oil price 
resulting from a loss of  supply (due to Russian sanctions 
or for any other reason) should properly be viewed as the 
level that would have prevailed if  Saudi spare capacity 
had been used to offset that disruption.
The market may continue to face this oversupply situation 
for some time to come. The P5+1 and Iranian nuclear 
deal concluded on July 14, 2015, will permit anywhere 
from 300,000 to 1,000,000 new bpd to enter the market. 
The timing of  this additional oil entering the market is 
yet to be determined, as it depends on when Iran is able 
to complete a lengthy list of  time-consuming nuclear 
steps.  However, though it could be earlier in 2016, it will 
likely begin as soon as March or April 2016. Iraqi and 
Libyan production could potentially increase robustly. 
Demand growth is projected to remain weak, and more 
importantly, the energy intensity of  growth in places like 
China is expected to decline sharply.28 Particularly, as 
productivity improves and costs decline, over the near 
to medium term, US oil production can continue to 
grow at lower prices, and the rate of  growth can respond 
more flexibly and quickly to any price increase from lost 
Russian supply, thus tempering the price hike—although 
this response still takes six months or longer, not weeks 
as with traditional spare capacity.29 
The combination of  spare capacity, increased US 
production, returned Iranian barrels, and other factors 
may mean the market can handle the loss of  1 to 2 
million bpd. Yet even this high level of  disruption would 
be far less than what the previous analysis suggested 
would be necessary to drive the Russian current account 
into deficit. 
Of  course, it is also the case that higher prices are 
more meaningful when prices are already high, and less 
meaningful in the reverse. Such was the case in 2012, 
when oil prices were high and Iranian production was 
being removed from the market. At that time, there was 
considerable concern that a loss in substantial Iranian 
production would create a major price push. But due 
both to increased supply and reduced demand, the 
impact was relatively modest and manageable. 
There is a world of  difference between seeking crude oil 
export reductions at $100 per barrel and seeking them at 
$50 per barrel. Though there can be little debate that—
on economic grounds—net oil importers prefer lower 
prices, it is also true that economies can adjust to certain 
economic conditions. The rise in oil prices to over $100 
a barrel for the first time in 2008 caused strong concerns 
about the impact on consumer economies. However, 
those economies adjusted as prices spent much of  the 
period between 2011 and mid-2014 above that level. For 
that reason, the fall in prices since mid-2014 has been 
described as a windfall for net oil importers. At the 
same time, the IMF has noted that, without appropriate 
adjustments in fiscal policies, many economies could 
find lower oil prices to be problematic, including in 
relation to managing public debt (particularly where 
there is energy subsidization) and inflation.30 Moreover, 
there are potentially deeper consequences of  lower oil 
prices, ranging from environmental (as the economic 
disincentive for lower-efficiency automobiles and energy 
consumption evaporates) to the political (as petro-states 
deal with the consequences of  less revenue coming in) to 
the financial (removing a powerful source of  investment 
that came from sovereign wealth funds of  oil-producing 
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Table 8: Reduction Scenarios with Import Compression at $50/barrel, $70/barrel, and $80/barrel   
(Figures are in billions of  USD unless otherwise noted.)
Source: IMF Article IV, July 2014; crude oil and oil product data from Haver; author’s calculations.
Article IV data 5% oil export  
reduction
10% oil export  
reduction
20% oil export  
reduction
Current Account at $50/barrel 32.8 43.3 36.2 22.1
Current Account at $60/barrel 32.8 70.1 61.6 44.6
Current Account at $70/barrel 32.8 96.9 87.0 67.2
Current Account at $80/barrel 32.8 123.8 112.5 89.9
states).31 Though no “ideal” oil price exists that has 
equal benefits for consumers and producers, it is likely 
true that an increase in price from where it is at present 
would not prove catastrophic for consumers, provided 
it is appropriately built into oil market projections and 
does not spark a precipitous rise in prices. Notably, 
this may be particularly true with respect to the United 
States, given the changes to the oil dependency of  the 
US economy and domestic oil production, as President 
Obama’s chief  economist and Chairman of  the Council 
of  Economic Advisors Jason Furman noted on April 28 
when he said that “whatever happens to oil, whether it 
goes up or down, or does some combination of  both, 
it’s not going to affect our economy as much as it would 
have otherwise…we’re considerably less vulnerable to 
oil shocks than in the past.”32 
As noted above though, one risk of  increased prices is that 
Russia could avoid or mitigate the negative repercussions 
of  the sanctions by offsetting production against higher 
prices. Table 8 shows the broad trend: for every $10 
increase in prices, Russia would see roughly $26 billion 
more per year in a 5 percent reduction scenario, and $22 
billion more per year in a 20 percent reduction scenario. 
This might then be offset with an increase in imports 
by Russia (reducing the current account surplus), or the 
Russians could continue to push for indigenization of  
certain industries in order to rebuild its reserves. 
Whatever the upward price impact may be, there is 
also a question whether such a price increase would be 
sustained. First, there remains the question as to whether 
a price increase would be a temporary result of  market 
jitters or would instead stabilize at the higher price over 
time. Second, there is some amount of  risk premium 
that would also probably become priced into the market 
as tensions with Russia increased, both out of  concern 
of  future supply disruptions and the possibility of  
military conflict. Third, as noted previously, there is 
some spare capacity in the market and the possibility of  
new production coming online, whether from Iran, the 
United States, or elsewhere. Such new production would 
take time to come online, of  course, and its flexibility and 
responsiveness remain in question. Depending on how 
large the loss of  Russian supply is, it could take months 
for some new supply to come to market to offset the loss 
and, if  large enough, years for additional supply to offset 
the remainder. In other words, while it is true that higher 
oil prices would help Russia weather the storm, it should 
not be taken as a given that prices would remain elevated 
for the long term. Some steps can be taken and built into 
the sanctions effort in order to mitigate the impact. Last, 
in the event of  a real panic in the market, the presence 
of  strategic oil reserves in the United States and beyond 
makes it possible that government action could be taken 
to address what would be an oil problem created by a 
national security crisis.
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This analysis can lead to the conclusion that reducing 
Russia’s oil exports would have a likely negative impact 
on the Russian economy with minimal risk to the 
international community directly, provided prices can be 
managed. However, Russia’s self-defense mechanisms 
may be sufficient to water down the impact and to 
prolong the crisis. As such, the trick is to find the 
combination of  stressors on the Russian economy that 
induce pain in a variety of  ways beyond oil reductions. A 
potential sanctions enhancement strategy could include 
the following elements:
1. Targeted reduction of  10 to 20 percent 
of  Russian oil exports (crude and oil 
products), timed in order to build space 
for new production to come online as 
needed in order to compensate for Russian 
lost exports. As noted above, this would not 
be enough by itself  to inflict crippling damage 
on Russia’s economy, but it would contribute 
to its instability and deprive Russia of  yet 
another source of  hard currency. Assuming 
that Russian import compression behaved as 
in the past, this would cost Russia between 
approximately $155 billion and $170 billion 
in foreign exchange, bringing the current 
account surplus to $22.1 billion. It would be 
achieved in a similar fashion as the Iran oil 
reductions of  2012–2013: establishing state-
based targets for oil export levels on 6- to 
12-month schedules and engaging in robust 
diplomatic activity to secure reductions to the 
levels, with potential readiness to go further 
in the future.
2. Restrictions on more general investment 
in Russia. Though it is true that Russia’s 
investment climate is poor, this is not stopping 
money from continuing to be channeled into 
Russian sovereign bonds.33 Such transactions 
could be targeted, perhaps first by prohibiting 
any new such investments and—over time—
requiring a divestment of  US and EU companies 
from these investments in Russia.
3. Restrictions on services to support 
Russia’s present production of  oil. The 
sanctions imposed thus far have targeted 
future development in Russia rather than the 
present production capacity of  Russian fields. 
Russia will already find it difficult to maintain 
its oil production levels and to correct the 
damage done to its overall growth potential. 
The International Energy Agency concluded 
in its Medium Term Oil Market Report that 
Russian oil production can be expected to 
drop by 560,000 barrels from now until 2020 
as a result of  the imposition of  sanctions, 
lack of  investment, and natural degradation 
of  its oil fields.34 This amount, independently, 
would not be fatal to Russia’s overall economic 
potential; it will exacerbate its problems. 
 
Taking measures a step further to limit foreign 
support for Russia’s current oil production 
activities would contribute to the bleeding it is 
presently experiencing. Importantly, it would 
also accelerate a broader minimization of  
Russia’s value to the international economy that 
ultimately would make future, more aggressive 
sanctions options more achievable. Such 
measures could include a prohibition on any 
provision of  services that supports Russian crude 
oil production or more novelty aspects—such as 
services associated with logistics, transportation, 
or other arrangements—that facilitate bringing 
Russian oil to market. A smaller-scale approach 
could also be enlisted by targeting the export of  
equipment or technical support to Russia that 
facilitates oil production. 
4. Expansion of  the Office of  Foreign Assets 
Control Specially Designated Nationals 
and Blocked Persons List, and possibly its 
application to third parties. Though observers 
often point to the possibility of  sanctions being 
imposed on Russia’s access to the SWIFT system, 
this is by no means the only way to target non-
US and non-EU financial activities with Russian 
A FUTURE SANCTIONS PACKAGE
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banks and companies. The United States has 
successfully used its SDN list to convince many 
global institutions to halt their interactions with 
designated entities and individuals. This kind 
of  pressure could once again be undertaken 
with an expansion of  the SDN list to include 
more Russian banks and prominent businesses. 
Because these entities probably have ties to 
US companies and banks as well as those of  
other US partners, this would impose greater 
costs on the US and partner economies. 
 
If  necessary, the United States could also 
consider the development of  more far-reaching 
secondary tools, including an analog to the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
and Divestment Act of  2010’s authority to 
prohibit access to the US financial system of  
any entity that engages in transactions with US-
designated Russian entities and individuals. This 
is a powerful (and, taken in consideration with 
my already-noted concerns with overuse of  the 
US sanctions regime, dangerous) tool, but one 
that is available if  need be. 
Such measures as these would deepen the impact of  
an oil reduction strategy, integrating it into a more 
comprehensive attack on the Russian economy. They 
would also take time to develop, define, and coordinate 
with international partners (particularly if  a broader oil 
reduction effort were part of  the effort). With such a 
campaign, however, there are risks.
RUSSIA REACTS
There are two primary (and intertwined) problems with 
the conclusion that targeting oil is achievable in concert 
with other tools:
1. EU energy needs and political problems; and
2. Russian responses are unpredictable.
First and foremost, EU energy needs and the unpredictable 
nature of  Moscow’s response could create a major 
political headache for any sanctions strategy targeting 
Russian oil exports. Oil supplies themselves are generally 
replaceable in today’s oil market, and consequently, any 
EU decision to forego imports from Russia could be 
made up from other suppliers (up to a certain amount 
of  oil and considering quality differentials, naturally), 
possibly including access to strategic reserves. The real 
threat to EU energy supplies would come from Russia’s 
ability to turn off  the natural gas taps in response. Several 
countries in the EU are wholly dependent on Russia for 
energy supplies, and even accounting for their antipathy 
to the Russian government, they would have to carefully 
consider their vote for any such sanctions regime. Several 
EU member states have taken steps to improve natural 
gas supply security since the 2009 gas crisis, including the 
most vulnerable Eastern European member countries. 
These include new LNG import terminals in Poland and 
Lithuania, increased storage capacities across the region, 
improved cross-border pipeline interconnectivity, and 
reverse flow capabilities on key transit pipelines, which 
now enable Russian gas to flow all the way back to 
Ukraine via EU member states in sufficient quantities. 
However, even with these protective measures, Europe is 
not prepared to cope with a complete halt of  Russian gas 
supplies. LNG import capacities are technically sufficient 
to replace Russian imports entirely with liquefied natural 
gas, but this would require a substantial increase in spot 
LNG prices to attract vast volumes of  LNG to the 
European market, and impose great costs on all natural 
gas–importing countries in Europe. Some countries in 
southeast Europe (e.g., Bulgaria) would still be unable to 
replace all Russian gas with alternate sources, given the 
poor interconnectivity in this part of  Europe. 
At the same time, Russia itself  would also be hurt from 
any decision to reduce natural gas supplies. Though 
Russia has made considerable efforts to diversify its gas 
exports away from the EU, Europe remains the single 
most important export market for Russia at the moment. 
Russia’s first pipeline link to China, the so-called “Power 
of  Siberia” or “eastern route” with a transit capacity 
of  38 billion cubic meters will be supplied from newly 
developed East Siberian fields, and will not divert volumes 
away from Europe. The pipeline will only enter service 
after 2019. The so-called “Altai Pipeline” or “western 
route” is intended to turn Russia into a swing supplier 
between China and Europe by connecting the countries’ 
Western Siberian gas fields to both export markets. But 
progress on this project has been slow, and operation 
start is not expected before 2020. Shutting down 
European gas exports completely would probably not 
ISSUE BRIEF: REVISITING OIL SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
24 |  CENTER ON GLObAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMbIA SIPA
be a realistic response, even for Gazprom. Previous gas 
supply disruptions largely resulted from disagreements 
with Ukraine on gas prices and transit fees, and Gazprom 
has made great efforts in recent years to maintain its 
reputation as a reliable supplier to European consumers. 
This reputation is not only being scrutinized in Europe, 
but also in China and Turkey, Russia’s most important 
future gas buyers. Consequently, this would not be a 
straightforward decision for Moscow. Maintaining 100 
percent of  natural gas exports while only suffering a 
20 percent reduction in oil sales is economically more 
sensible than suffering a major reduction in natural gas 
exports alongside such a reduction in oil sales. The value 
of  natural gas sales to Russia is much less than oil, but 
is not miniscule, particularly during strapped financial 
times. Moreover, as Table 6 shows, in an environment 
in which Russia’s current account surplus has been 
significantly reduced to approximately $22.1 billion, 
cutting even a third of  its natural gas supply would tip 
Russia into a current account deficit that it has no clear 
way to finance, other than deeper cuts to imports.
That said, the decision on whether to cut off  Europe 
would not be an economic one. Rather, it would be a 
political act taken by the Russian government as a whole, 
and as such, noneconomic factors will play a significant 
role in Moscow’s decision-making. Though Gazprom 
has sought to be seen as apolitical, Putin has often used 
energy supply as a foreign policy tool, witnessed in the 
cut-off  of  natural gas to Europe in 2006 and 2009. It 
would be folly to suggest that, once challenged, Moscow 
would not respond, but the response could also be 
at a time and place of  its choosing. For example, it is 
reasonable to believe that the Russians could keep the 
gas flowing during the warm months and then cut it off  
during the winter. Quite naturally, this is what would be 
going through the minds of  the EU’s leadership were 
they to consider an oil export reduction strategy, as well 
as any resulting impacts of  the Greek debt situation, a 
nuclear deal with Iran, and future negotiations on global 
trade and climate accords. 
Over time though, this issue may become less searing 
for the EU as alternative sources of  natural gas are 
developed. In the last couple of  years, it appeared that 
Asia would be the premium market for LNG, and most 
US liquefied natural gas exports will target the Asian 
market. However, Asian oil-linked prices have dropped 
substantially since the 2014 oil price collapse, and 
European spot LNG prices have inched above Asian 
levels. This means that substantial amounts of  US natural 
gas can actually be exported to Europe from Cheniere 
Energy’s Sabine Pass terminal starting in late-2015, and 
from at least four other US export terminals by 2019. 
(See the Center on Global Energy Policy’s September 
2014 report “American Gas to the Rescue?” for further 
details.) Still, at this time, the EU remains in thrall to the 
export of  Russian gas.
Of  course, Russia’s response options are not limited 
to sanctions evasion or reciprocation. Russia may also 
continue with its project of  trying to structure an 
alternative to the US-dominated economic system that, 
over time, would help Russia insulate itself  from these 
dynamics. Seeking investment and financial support 
from China, for example, could be an opportunity for 
Putin to undermine both the sanctions and the system. 
However, it is questionable whether Russia could get 
sufficient support from non-Western sources to counter 
Western sanctions. Furthermore, as in the case of  Iran, 
Russia may find that its erstwhile partners have their own 
economic and political concerns to worry about and may 
not be prepared to throw in their lot with Putin.
There is also the military dimension. Though it is beyond 
the scope of  this paper to assess Russian military strategy, 
it is inescapable that Russia has sought to demonstrate 
its readiness to saber-rattle or undertake cyber-attacks 
in response to tensions in Ukraine. I suspect that Russia 
does not seek a military confrontation with the EU or 
the United States. However, this cannot be dismissed 
out of  hand or considered an impossible scenario 
should economic pressure begin to threaten the Russian 
government in a serious fashion. Moreover, increased 
military tensions also breed the possibility of  accidents 
that can become uncontrolled escalations. That said, this 
is a high-stakes situation. If  the United States and its 
partners are serious about challenging Russian regional 
adventurism, then they also have a credibility and resolve 
problem if  they fail to utilize the tools at their disposal. 
A calculated, careful decision must be made about the 
potential for excessive Russian escalation and how best 
to handle it in the context of  confronting Russia for its 
misbehavior.
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Of  course, all of  these factors will make selling an oil 
reduction strategy all the more difficult, particularly if  the 
math behind it suggests that it would take a substantial 
cut in Russian exports in order to prompt significant 
economic damage. There are already hints within 
Europe that sustaining the existing sanctions regime 
will be difficult. Augmenting it with far more sanctions, 
particularly those that risk setting off  an escalatory spiral 
with Russia, would be a very steep climb.
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Of  course, an unresolved question in this analysis 
is, would any of  this shake President Vladimir Putin’s 
strategic thinking? Probably not, if  the objective of  the 
sanctions is to secure the return of  Crimea to Ukraine, 
dissolution of  insurgent groups in eastern Ukraine, and 
the end of  Russia’s ambitions on the country altogether. 
Russian rhetoric following the annexation of  Crimea 
argues heavily in favor of  a conclusion that it would take 
far more than economic woes—even significant ones—
to get Russia to reverse course on that front. Putin’s own 
popularity in Russia, despite hardship, also buttresses the 
theory that more is needed to change Russia’s approach. 
Moreover, even a superficial review of  Russian history 
speaks to a tremendous capacity on the part of  the 
Russian people to endure harsh conditions and persevere. 
We should expect no less an effort in this instance, which 
also means that the costs would need to be far more 
than lost economic opportunity to cripple the Russian 
government or people. 
But, as with all proper sanctions regimes, outright 
resolution should not necessarily be the objective 
of  enhanced sanctions against Russia. The point of  
intensifying the pain on the Russian government and its 
population through such measures would be to make a 
diplomatic solution of  the current crisis more palatable. 
Though Russia may not give up Crimea in response to 
any cost, Russia may view Ukrainian association with the 
EU differently and, consequently, be prepared to accept 
results from a diplomatic endeavor that are far different 
than its preferred path. As such, it may be that the best 
outcome achievable from the use of  enhanced sanctions 
is real Russian cooperation in the implementation of  the 
Minsk cease-fire and the political process that it was to 
set in motion. If  so, then sanctions would have done 
their job. 
It would be advisable at this juncture for governments 
to begin, first, to plan for a future eventuality in which 
Russian oil exports are cut off  (not the least because, with 
current sanctions, Russian oil exports are almost certain 
to drop as future investment is curtailed); and, second, 
to game out how to respond to Russian countermoves. 
There may be policy tools that would be advantageous 
to have in place far in advance of  such a strategy, such 
as an ability for the United States to offset European 
energy needs with either US supplies or arrangements 
with other partners to divert new sources of  natural 
gas toward Europe. It would be advisable to begin the 
discussion now within the International Energy Agency 
and among other US partners as to how markets would 
be managed in the event of  a Russian energy crisis. 
Even doing so would usefully broadcast to Russia that 
international resolve is strengthening, not weakening, in 
the face of  its intransigence and that even Russia cannot 
withstand global economic alignment against it.
CONCLUSION
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APPENDIX: IRAN CASE HISTORY
This appendix explores oil reduction efforts from the 
Iran example, the first instance of  a calculated effort to 
reduce foreign oil exports over time, which can serve as 
a blueprint for an oil reduction strategy for Russia. 
As I have written previously, the intent in applying the 
original oil reduction sanctions against Iran was not to 
target oil explicitly.35 Rather, oil reductions were a by-
product of  the structure put in place to permit countries 
to continue purchasing Iranian oil and depositing 
payments in accounts held by the Central Bank of  Iran 
(CBI). 
This is surprising to some, but it is a function of  the Iranian 
oil economy. The CBI is the sole authorized recipient 
of  Iranian oil sales (though, of  course, these funds are 
then circulated throughout the Iranian government and 
economy according to national budgets). Consequently, 
when the United States imposed sanctions on any third-
party financial institution conducting business with the 
CBI in December 2011, a mechanism had to be created 
to permit payments for oil sales or risk the sudden 
halt in those sales. The mechanism chosen was a freely 
available exception to the sanctions, provided that the 
country governing the financial institutions conducting 
the transactions reduced its purchases of  Iranian crude 
oil by a significant degree. The legislation left open 
the definition of  “significant” but narrowly defined 
the Iranian products that could permit a reduction 
determination to be made (leaving aside, for example, 
gas condensates).
The result was legislation in the FY12 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) that worked insofar as the 
administration was able to achieve approximately 1.5 
million bpd in reductions in 2012–2013. However, it 
was by no means an easily translated statute, and its 
puzzling omissions soon became obvious. In addition 
to the definition of  “crude oil,” the statute ignored the 
possibility of  payments in kind or those facilitated by 
banks other than the CBI or another US-sanctioned 
Iranian financial institution. Moreover, the statute 
created a scenario in which an entity could only be 
protected from sanctions if  its government orchestrated 
a reduction in oil purchases, even though in many 
countries, such decisions are the province of  individual 
companies rather than necessarily government policy. 
Last, the entity that would be sanctioned under the terms 
of  the statute is the bank that made the payment, not 
the government responsible for securing the exception 
to sanctions or the importing company itself. Altogether, 
the statute needed repair.
Executive Order 13622—which was promulgated on 
July 30, 2012—addressed some of  these problems 
within the limits of  the law. From this point forward, 
any entity facilitating the purchase of  Iranian oil outside 
of  a significant reduction exception could be held 
liable for sanctions, and purchases in kind (as well as 
barters or other accounting tricks that Iran might have 
employed) were similarly barred. The definitional issue 
surrounding “crude oil” remained because it was outside 
of  the president’s legal authorities to fix this problem, 
and this remains a problem today. The definition of  
“significant” was not pegged, which appropriately gave 
scope to define the results of  national oil reduction 
efforts depending on a variety of  factors. These include 
both the overall size of  the reductions to be made (so, 
for example, a reduction of  10 percent of  500,000 bpd 
could be seen as inherently more damaging to Iran 
than a 20 percent reduction of  200,000 bpd) and the 
size of  the oil purchase in the overall oil imports of  a 
country (acknowledging that a 20 percent reduction of  
oil purchases from a total oil import budget of  200,000 
bpd may cause more problems for a country than a 
20 percent reduction of  oil purchases from a total oil 
import budget of  6 million bpd).
In all, the results of  the Iran oil sanctions effort are well 
established, despite the deficiencies of  the original law 
that were addressed through appropriate and robust 
implementation. However, any future oil reduction 
strategy could be designed to avoid some of  these 
pitfalls. For the purposes of  this paper, the main lessons 
to be gleaned from this experience are as follows:
• Pick definitions carefully. Words like 
“crude oil” often get thrown about inexpertly. 
However, the incorrect use of  terms led to 
real implementation problems in the Iran case 
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that could be corrected through more precise 
drafting.
• Ensure that target sanctions are targeted on 
those involved in the bad acts in question. 
Before the administration fixed the law, it would 
not have been out of  the realm of  possibility for 
an importer to create a sanctions problem for 
its bank and escape any real repercussions of  its 
own. Similarly, giving banks no ability to influence 
their sanctions fate by relying on national-level 
reduction efforts may have helped isolate Iran 
further, but it also created an unreasonable 
burden on banks to police the efforts of  their 
clients. Banks, as a result, became primary 
enforcement agencies of  the sanctions. This had 
its own advantages but may be contributing to 
fatigue with US sanctions efforts more generally 
(a concern explored previously).36
• Define the intended end result and provide 
some clarity for those to be affected by 
the measures. By not defining the intended 
end result (Driving Iran to zero sales? To 
a de minimis amount? To a de minimis 
amount so long as global oil markets were not 
impaired?), the United States had flexibility, 
but also a substantial burden to explain to its 
partners what its goals were in the abstract. 
 
Moreover, the obvious lack of  communication 
between the executive branch and legislative 
branch also created confusion. For example, at 
a time when the administration was using the 
ambiguity involved in the word “significant” to 
try to obtain large cuts in purchases, Senators 
Robert Menendez and Mark Kirk issued a public 
letter that established a bar of  18 percent. This 
may have been lower than what was achievable 
through executive branch negotiations, but the 
moment that it came out, the letter set a virtual 
ceiling. By trying to micromanage the efforts of  
the administration’s negotiators, Menendez and 
Kirk ultimately undermined their own endeavors.
ISSUE BRIEF: ISSUE BRIEF: REVISITING OIL SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
energypolicy.columbia.edu | JULY 2015  | 29
NOTES
1. Office of  Foreign Assets Control website. Available 
at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.
2. Shishkin, Phillip. March 5, 2015. “US Sanctions over 
Ukraine Hit Two Russian Banks Hardest.” Wall Street 
Journal. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/
u-s-sanctions-over-ukraine-hit-two-russian-banks-
hardest-1425597150. 
3. The Economist. February 14, 2015. “Fancy Footwork.” 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/
bus iness/21643122-how-bus inesses - l inked-
blacklisted-oligarchs-avoid-western-sanctions-
fancy-footwork.
4. Testimony of  A/S Danny Glaser, US Department 
of  the Treasury. July 9, 2014. Available at: http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl2556.aspx.
5. Blog post by OFAC Director Adam Szubin, US 
Department of  the Treasury. June 2, 2014. Available 
at: http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/
Sanctions-101-Pt-2-.aspx.
6. World Bank. April 2015. “Russia Economic Report: 
The Dawn of  a New Economic Era?”
7. IMF. World Economic Outlook. April 2015. 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2015/01/index.htm. 
8. International Energy Agency. February 10, 2015. 
“Medium Term Oil Market Report.”
9. IMF Article IV on Russia. July 2014. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/
cr14175.pdf.
10. Data derived from the BP Statistical Review for 
2013 and Energy Information Administration’s 
overall data on Russian net oil exports. Available 
at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.
cfm?fips=RS&trk=m#pet. 
11. Tejas, Aditya. April 28, 2015. “Putin Says Sanctions 
Amid Falling Oil Prices Cost Russia $160B, But 




12. IMF Article IV on Russia. July 2014.
13. Reuters. April 7, 2015. “Russian c.bank chief  confident 
on inflation, banks, rouble.” Available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/07/russia-crisis-
economy-idUSL6N0X419V20150407. 
14. Moscow Times. April 7, 2015. “Russian unemployment 




15. World Bank. April 2015. “Russia Economic Report: 
The Dawn of  a New Economic Era?”
16. World Bank. April 2015. “Russia Economic Report: 
The Dawn of  a New Economic Era?”
17. World Bank. April 2015. “Russia Economic Report: 
The Dawn of  a New Economic Era?”




19. Central Bank of  Russia. Accessed on May 7, 
2015. Available at: http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/hd_
base/?PrtId=mrrf_m.
20. Central Bank of  Russia. Accessed on May 15, 
2015. Available at: http://www.cbr.ru/eng/
statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=itm_11905#CheckedItem; 
and http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/print.
aspx?f i le=credi t_stat is t ics/schedule_debt_e.
htm&pid=svs&sid=vd_GVD. 
21. Korsunskaya, Darya. March 16, 2015. “Russia Sees 
Reserve Fund Drain at $50 Billion in New Budget 
Plan.” Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.
com/article/2015/03/16/russia-crisis-budget-
idUSL6N0WI27420150316.
ISSUE BRIEF: REVISITING OIL SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
30 |  CENTER ON GLObAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMbIA SIPA
22. Schneider, Ondrej. May 13, 2015. “Russia: Recession 
Begins.” Institute for International Finance.
23. EIA. Accessed on July 7, 2015. Available at: http://
www.eia.gov/finance/markets/supply-opec.cfm.
24. EIA. June 9, 2015. “Short-Term Energy Outlook.” 
Available at: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/
report/global_oil.cfm.
25. My thanks to Jason Bordoff  for these insights into 
how to think about the role of  spare capacity in 
today’s oil market, which draw on his forthcoming 
policy brief  for the Center on Global Energy Policy.
26. Bordoff, Jason, and Akos Losz. Spring 2015. “Oil 
Shock: Decoding the Causes and Consequences 
of  the 2014 Oil Price Drop.” Horizons. http://
w w w. c i r s d . o r g / u p l o a d s / m a g a z i n e s / p d f /
Jason%20Bordoff%20and%20Akos%20Losz.
pdf_1429732733_english.pdf.
27. Fattouh, Bassam, and Anupama Sen. June 2015. 
“Saudi Arabia Oil Policy: More than Meets the Eye?” 
Available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEP-13.pdf.
28. Raval, Anjil. April 16, 2015. “Oil Demand Seen 




29. Bordoff, Jason, and Akos Losz. Spring 2015. “Oil 
Shock: Decoding the Causes and Consequences 
of  the 2014 Oil Price Drop.” Horizons, http://
w w w. c i r s d . o r g / u p l o a d s / m a g a z i n e s / p d f /
Jason%20Bordoff%20and%20Akos%20Losz.
pdf_1429732733_english.pdf.
30. IMF. April 2015. “Fiscal Monitor.” Available 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
fm/2015/01/pdf/fm1501.pdf.
31. Naim, Moises. March 31, 2015. “The Hidden 




32. Loveless, Bill. May 3, 2015. “WH Economist: 
Oil Price Benefits Near for US Economy.” 
h t t p : / / w w w. u s a t o d a y. c o m / s t o r y / m o n e y /
business/2015/05/03/loveless-furman-oil-prices-
economy/26772079/.
33. Rapoza, Kenneth. February 23, 2015. “Russia’s 
Dollar Denominated Debt Survives Junk Bond 
Status.” Forbes. Available at: http://www.forbes.
com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/02/23/russias-dollar-
denominated-debt-survives-junk-bond-status/.
34. International Energy Agency. February 10, 2015. 
“Medium Term Oil Market Report.”
35. Nephew, Richard, March 2, 2015. “Implications of  
New Oil Sanctions on Iran.” Available at: http://
energypolicy.columbia.edu/on-the-record/issue-
brief-implications-new-oil-sanctions-iran. Nephew, 
Richard, March 27, 2015. “A Sanctions Approach to 






36. Nephew, Richard, May 21, 2015. “The Future 




The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of  Ceyhan. The first barrels of  
crude shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into 
tankers in May 2014. Threats of  legal action by Iraq’s 
central government have reportedly held back buyers 
to take delivery of  the cargoes so far. The pipeline can 
currently operate at a capacity of  300,000 b/d, but the 
Kurdish government plans to eventually ramp-up its 
capacity to 1 million b/d, as Kurdish oil production 
increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of  Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of  operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of  crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

